In addition to providing a succinct history of the field of genocide studies, this article examines such issues as the critical need to address the toughest barriers to the prevention of and intervention against genocide (e.g., realpolitik, the lack of political will, and the reform of the UN Security Council, including the make-up and operation of the Permanent Five members [Great Britain, US, France, Russia, and China]); whether the Crimes Against Humanity Initiative will make a real difference vis-à -vis the prevention of and intervention against genocide; the critical need for the field to be more inclusive by welcoming and nurturing a strong working relationship with international relations and peace studies scholars; the need for genocide scholars to more closely monitor ''hot spots'' (areas where crimes against humanity and genocide are likely to erupt or have already erupted); and the activist/non-activist divide in the field of genocide studies.
While genocide is the intent to destroy in whole or in part a particular group as such, the stark reality is that individual human beings suffer the torment, cruelty, and brutality meted out during the genocidal period. While individual members of the group are frequently killed in horrific ways, survivors often live out the rest of their existences on earth bereft in about every way imaginable. Undoubtedly, it is my human rights background and various experiences (including incidents and situations that I have witnessed during my stints in Africa) that have driven me to keep the individual at the forefront of my mind as I delve deeper into the maw of genocide.
Over the past eight years I have spent an ever-increasing amount of time in Africa-the Nuba Mountains in Sudan and refugee camps in Chad, conducting research into the government of Sudan's genocidal actions against the people of the Nuba Mountains in the late 1980s and early 1990s and Sudan's genocidal actions against the black Africans in Darfur, respectively-and in doing so, I have seen the results of atrocity crimes up close. It changes one forever, as it should. In my case, it redoubled my dedication to focusing on the welfare of targeted groups and the individuals who comprise them. What has been most evident during the course of my research into the government of Sudan's propensity for mass violence is that when serious human rights violations are allowed to go unchecked and perpetrators are allowed to continue to perpetrate atrocities unabated, the seeds of future crimes against humanity and/or genocide are likely being sown. For me, this underscores the fact that as soon as there is evidence that serious human rights violations are about to be perpetrated, or are underway, it is imperative that they be halted immediately. It is unconscionable to ignore them, and it is nonsensical to wait to see if they are going to eventuate in crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and/or genocide. Ideally, at the first signs of serious conflict between groups, efforts should be made to ameliorate them through the good offices of the United Nations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and specialists in conflict resolution. Yes, the world is huge and rife with problems, but nothing short of ameliorating conflict and stanching serious human rights violations early on is going to prevent genocide. 2 To date, far too many genocide scholars, intergovernmental officials, and leaders of individual states have been content to play the waiting game before setting into motion serious attempts to ameliorate such conflicts.
After presenting an overview of the genesis and evolution of the field of genocide studies, I will limit my comments to five issues: (1) three major impediments to the prevention and intervention of genocide (realpolitik, lack of political will, and the composition, operation, and power of the Permanent Five [P5] of the UN Security Council); (2) the critical need to bring other disciplines into the field of genocide studies to help develop efficacious means of prevention and intervention; (3) the Crimes Against Humanity Initiative; (4) the value of genocide scholars working in areas of potential and actual conflict; and (5) the scholar/activist divide.
An Overview of the Field of Genocide Studies
Before 1980, very few individuals-with the exception of international law experts analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG) and journalists covering such tragedies as the Bangladesh Genocide (1971) or the closing off of Cambodia by the Khmer Rouge (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) )-thought about, let alone wrote about, genocide as a broad, general issue (as opposed to individual cases, such as the Armenian Genocide, the Holocaust, the Bangladesh Genocide). If that sounds like hyperbole, one should search through the works on genocide-books and refereed journal articles-published before 1980, or, for that matter, before 1990.
The names of those who laid the groundwork for the development of the field are now well known. Above all, of course, was Raphael Lemkin, the Polish jurist who was forced into exile by the rise of the Nazis. He coined the term ''genocide'' and fought tirelessly for the establishment of the UNCG. Among those who followed in his footsteps and virtually created the field of genocide studies are illustrious names such as Leo Kuper, Irving Louis Horowitz, Israel W. Charny, and Helen Fein. Without their pioneering efforts and the efforts of the scholars who followed shortly thereafter, it is probable that the field of genocide studies would never have developed, or at least not as early as it did. That too may sound like hyperbole, but had they not individually and sometimes collectively organized the first conferences dedicated to the subject of genocide, presented papers at conferences hosted by their respective disciplines or universities, written the first books, developed the first research tools, and created the first institutes, there certainly would have been no foundation for second-, third-, and fourth-generation scholars to conveniently step onto, as they now can and do, and proceed apace as if genocide studies had existed forever.
Not 4 Fein, a sociologist, served for many years as the Executive Director of one of the earliest scholarly organizations focusing on genocide, the New York City-based Institute for the Study of Genocide (ISG), which has over the years produced an informative newsletter (ISG Newsletter) that contains reports on ongoing atrocity crimes as well as overviews of research by scholars in the field. ISG has also hosted a number of colloquia on a wide array of issues. Not to be overlooked is the fact that for the past thirty years she has continued to produce thought-provoking and timely research into an array of genocide-related issues.
In addition to his own research on genocide, Horowitz, a sociologist and founder of Transaction Publishers, was one of the first publishers to earnestly publish works on genocide. To date, Transaction's Series on Genocide has published works by Israel W. Charny, Richard Hovannisian, Ben Kiernan, and Samuel Totten, among others, including the scores of scholars who have contributed to Genocide: A Critical Bibliographic Review.
While there are others who contributed to the growth of the field and were innovators in their own right, the aforementioned scholars are the ones who truly led the pack. If not for them, it is hard to imagine the field of genocide studies being as robust as it is today.
When I entered the field of genocide studies in 1986 there were, literally, no more than just over a dozen scholars worldwide focusing on genocide-that is, on genocide theory, the prevention of and intervention against genocide, and/or comparative genocide-and a couple of dozen or so who focused on individual cases of genocide other than the Holocaust. The first group was made up of the previously mentioned individuals (Kuper, Charny, Horowitz, and Fein) as well as Roger Smith, Herb Hirsch, Barbara Harff, Eric Markusen, Frank Chalk, Kurt Jonassohn, and a few others. The latter category included, for example, Richard Arens (genocide of the Ache in Paraguay); Jon Bridgman (genocide of the Hereros in southwest Africa); Robert Conquest, James Mace, and Roman Serbyn (the Soviet Manmade Famine in Ukraine); Craig Etcheson, David Hawk, and Ben Kiernan (the Cambodian Genocide); and Vahakn Dadrian, Richard Hovannisian, and Yves Ternon (the Armenian Genocide).
Essentially, over the past 30 years the field has expanded from that small coterie of individuals to hundreds of scholars and graduate students who are broadening the focus of the field and enriching it in ways that were only dreamed of years ago.
During the early years, most scholars focused on one or more of the following: building theoretical constructs in regard to the causes of genocide; developing case studies of genocide; wrestling with the definition of genocide in the UNCG and/or developing their own definition of genocide 5 ; collecting first-person accounts of various genocides; analyzing issues germane to prevention and intervention; and creating tools for scholars and students to use in their study of genocide.
As Moses. 8 In addition to those mentioned above, there has been an explosion of books, refereed articles, and book chapters on an eclectic array of topics and issues, including genocide theory, causes of genocide, cases of genocide, the impact of colonialism on indigenous groups across the globe, ''forgotten'' genocides, comparative studies of genocide, prevention of genocide, intervention against genocide, genocide and international law, court cases of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, the aftermath of genocide, and denial of genocide.
Finally, an innovation worth mentioning is French scholar Jacques Semelin's Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence (OEMV 9 Over the years, the increased attention to the subject of genocide resulted from a variety of factors, including e Interest piqued by the earlier works of genocide; e Dissolution of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War; e Efforts of the genocide institutes around the globe; e The 100-day genocide in Rwanda in which between 500,000 and one million people were slain; e The ongoing concern throughout the 1990s that genocide had been and was possibly continuing to be perpetrated in different parts of the former Yugoslavia; e The establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993 to try the alleged perpetrators of crimes (i.e., genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes) committed during the course of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia; e The establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in November 1994 ''for the prosecution of persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994'' 10 ; e The establishment of the International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS) in 1994 and its subsequent conferences; e The massacre (which was ultimately deemed a genocide) of 8,000 Muslim boys and men in Srebrenica in July 1995; e The adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in 1998; e An ever-increasing number of university courses being taught on genocide; e University-based institutes of genocide studies that offer degree programs (primarily master's degrees) in genocide studies 11 ; e Summer institutes with foci on a combination of human rights, crimes against humanity, and/or genocide 12 of Sudan and Janjaweed (the express purpose of the project was to collect data so that they could be analyzed by the US State Department to ascertain whether genocide had been perpetrated or not by the government of Sudan). 13 Today, the field of genocide studies is at a major turning point. As the pioneers of genocide studies enter their 80s and begin to slow down, the second-, third-, and fourth-generation scholars, with new research agendas and, in certain cases, new methodologies, are taking over the field. In addition to conducting new research into old cases of genocide (and revising findings that had largely been accepted as givens), they are, for example, examining cases of atrocity crimes that were rarely if ever examined through the lens of genocide (e.g., the atrocities perpetrated during the Dirty War in Argentina between 1976 and 1983) and raising new and critical questions about key issues (e.g., whether interventions to halt gross human rights violations might result in an escalation of atrocities and potentially genocide), and in doing so they are broadening, deepening and enriching the field. As a result, over and above macro-studies of genocide, we have micro-and meso-studies (and their various relationships), transnational genocide studies, critical genocide studies, the ramifications of colonialism and genocide, and the propounding of new theories regarding the causes of atrocity crimes, and so forth.
Some second-, third-, and fourth-generation scholars have begun scrutinizing previously overlooked archives in search of primary documents about genocides perpetrated a century or more ago in order to glean new insights into the antecedents, processes, and ramifications of such genocides. A small number of others are traveling to refugee camps and areas of conflict to carry out research. The upshot is that the boundaries of genocide studies are being stretched, issues delved into more deeply, and old conceptions revised. Not only is that as it should be but it is healthy and bodes well for the future of the field.
The Critical Need to Address the Toughest Barriers to Prevention and Intervention The Issues of Realpolitik and the Lack of Political Will
Over the past decade or so, both a court decision and a wide array of reports by various organizations have spelled out the need for the international community and individual states to be more proactive in addressing situations that are moving toward genocide or have already descended into genocide. 17 All of these documents share the view that the responsibility to protect those in danger of being subjected to mass violence trumps state sovereignty. That is, a state is responsible for protecting its own citizens and if it does not or cannot do so, then other nations across the globe have the responsibility to intervene and protect the individuals in danger of being seriously harmed or killed. The emergence of the concept of R2P represents a sea change vis-à -vis the longheld perspective of the sacrosanctness of state sovereignty. Essentially, the concept of R2P runs counter to a state's claim that state sovereignty prevents other nations from interfering in their so-called ''internal affairs'' when it is grossly mistreating its citizens or allowing a renegade group to violently harm its citizens.
R2P complements a rather remarkable judicial decision in regard to state responsibility to prevent genocide. What was addressed in part dealt with the issue of whether states are legally obligated to attempt to prevent genocide. More specifically, for over five decades (roughly from 1948 to 2000) scholars and others debated whether the UNCG legally obligates states to attempt to prevent genocide. Most asserted that while there is an inherent moral obligation to do so, there was no concomitant legal obligation. However, in the International Court of Justice's (ICJ) case of Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro, the ICJ held that states do, in fact, have a legal obligation to prevent genocide. 18 While the new paradigm of R2P is still emergent, it offers at least some hope for the future as it seems to suggest that the international community is beginning to take the seemingly ubiquitous perpetration of mass atrocities more seriously. Still, it is much too soon to be jubilant. It is one thing to create and support such an approach and quite another to act upon it. It is impossible to forget that the very nations that welcomed R2P have been many of the same ones that ratified the UNCG and then brazenly ignored, time and again, their promise to prevent genocide. Realpolitik, the lack of political will, and economic interests all played a part in the lack of timely and effective action.
Realpolitik, of course, drives decision making at the national and international levels, including at the UN Security Council and among the members of the P5 (i.e., United States, Great Britain, France, China, and the Federation of Russia). Until it can be overcome, realpolitik will override many, if not most, of the good intentions behind R2P and the new perspectives and approaches previously mentioned regardless of how ardently supported they are. 19 To believe otherwise verges on naiveté. That is not to say that such decisions and conceptual frameworks do not contribute by chipping away at the dominance of realpolitik, but when the impediments to timely and effective action (i.e., realpolitik, a lack of political will, and economic interests) are as ingrained as they are, it is going to take much, much more than a single concept to alter them in any real way. 20 So, while R2P is an effort in the right direction, when push comes to shove, what is going to prevent nations from resorting yet again to realpolitik when a genocidal crisis erupts? Any entity? Will there be any consequences 21 ? Or will it simply result in some finger pointing and a little embarrassment?
In the end, any reaction or consequence will likely be inconsequential. Nothing that will rock or threaten a government or nation's well-being. Nothing punitive. This is exactly why those who are vitally concerned with preventing and intervening against genocide (scholars, human rights activists, non-governmental and intergovernmental personnel, etc.) need to zero in on addressing how realpolitik can at least be increasingly softened as it relates to stanching crimes against humanity and genocide. The same is true in regard to the lack of political will. And a purported lack of resources for prevention and intervention missions must be overcome. Period.
To avoid focusing on such issues and impediments will simply prolong their effects when the time comes once again, and it will, to act to save the lives of hundreds of thousands of people. Right now, the lack of significant work on this front plays directly into self-deception and willed blindness, both of which make a mockery of much of the assembly-line-like churning out of reports, books, and articles that we, genocide scholars, are so prone to producing.
Reforming the Operation and Procedures of the UN Security Council and the Make-up and Operation of the Permanent Five
Over the past couple of decades many have looked askance at the make-up (and privileging) of the P5 of the UN Security Council, the power of the veto wielded by each member of the P5, the way in which realpolitik drives the decisions of each member of the P5, and the Council's extremely poor record when it comes to the prevention of and intervention against genocide. The P5 of the UN Security Council constitutes an elite club made up of the US, Britain, France, China, and Russia. Important benefits that members enjoy include (1) being the only permanent members of the Security Council (all other members serve on a rotating basis) 22 and (2) a special veto power over votes on any and all matters. In regards to the latter, if one of the P5 vetoes a resolution, it is automatically defeated, regardless of how pressing the issue may be or how ardently other members might support it. Thus, in a body composed of 192 nations, a single veto by a single member of the P5 can prevent an intervention to attempt to halt crimes against humanity and/or genocide.
Questions abound as to why those five countries should be privileged over all other countries in the world. While they are certainly among the most powerful and richest nations in the world, some have argued that in this day and age other countries, which have gained a toehold on power, wealth, and influence internationally, should be considered for potential membership in the elite club. In fact, for years, Germany, France, and India have called for reform to the UN Security Council and for an increase to the number of permanent members on the Council. Since at least since 2007, German Chancellor Angela Merkel has campaigned for a permanent German seat on the Security Council. 23 In November 2010, US President Barack Obama entered the fray, asserting that India should become a permanent member of the Council. 24 Still others abound that permanent membership should be more diverse, including at least one state from Africa and one from Central or South America. They argue that such inclusivity might result in the Permanent Members of the Security Council being more concerned, and thus proactive, when it comes to crises in thirdworld nations. Maybe, but it seems dubious. After all, each permanent member would still wield the all-powerful veto, which would allow it to squelch any motion or resolution that it perceived as counter to its own or its allies' interests.
Adding grease to the fire, many, if not most, of the P5's votes regarding intervention in genocide in the past have been driven by realpolitik. In other words, the P5 have not been concerned primarily with the fate of the potential victims of genocide but much more focused on whether intervening would be good for themselves or their allies. As the cliché goes, nation states do not have consciences. Concomitantly, the type of mission-Chapter VI (peacekeeping) or Chapter VII (peace enforcement) of the Charter of the United Nations 25 -is largely dictated by the P5 as well. Thus, instead of sending a robust mission in a timely fashion with a mandate that allows the mission's troops to handle a job properly, the P5 play politics and often approve missions that are sorely inadequate for the job. This is true for a whole host of reasons, but the main point here is that the P5 virtually take on the God-like role of deciding who will live and who will die.
It is also a fact that when the UN Security Council actually chooses to act in the face of genocide, it is more apt to do so after the genocide has broken out-that is, after a great deal of killing and other destruction has occurred rather than at an earlier point when the killing and destruction could have been prevented. That hardly honors the promise stated in Article 1 of the UNCG: ''The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.'' 26 Those who think or claim that reform to the Security Council and the P5 is an intractable issue could not be more wrong. Sooner or later everything is subject to change; it is only a question of how long it will be until the change is made, who will be behind the change, and how it will be made. With this in mind, genocide scholars need to begin to focus on the reformation of the Security Council with an eye toward making recommendations to the UN Secretary General and UN General Assembly. Certainly a team comprised of astute political scientists, international relations specialists, international law specialists, and ethicists, among others, could make a strong case for reform and develop significant ways to help reorient the UN Security Council so that it would at least be more open to the possibility of preventing mass atrocities before they break out and, in the event of an outbreak of genocide, be more proactive and conscientious in developing more timely, efficient, and effective missions. At a minimum, it seems, the following should be the focus of analysis and, ultimately, action: whether a Permanent Five (or any other number) should remain part and parcel of the UN Security Council; whether any member of the Security Council should hold an all-powerful veto; if the concept of the Permanent Group remains in place, how it could be made more diverse and fair so that thirdworld nations do not remain second-class members of the UN; how can the UN Security Council (and/or the UN General Assembly) be made more proactive in addressing gross human rights violations, crimes against humanity, and genocide; and a re-examination of the need to create a strong, well-trained, and well-resourced UN rapid-action force whose specialty would be stanching crimes against humanity and genocide. At one and the same time, such an analysis should include serious consideration of the analysis, insights, and suggestions posited in recent scholarly works and reports on the need to reform the UN Security Council in particular and the UN in general. An excellent starting point would be the host of issues that Michael Barnett examines in Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda. Barnett analyzes how the make-up and operation of the UN bureaucracy contributed to the decisions, and lack thereof, to halt the Rwandan Genocide and how those working at the UN approached the issue of Rwanda not as individuals concerned with saving lives but rather as members of a bureaucracy, 27 which basically caused decent human beings to adhere to institutional norms that militated against their zeroing in on the genocide as something that needed to be halted immediately.
Crimes Against Humanity 28 Initiative
In 2008, the Crimes Against Humanity Initiative was established by a group of international law specialists to ''study the need for and to ultimately elaborate a comprehensive international convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against humanity.'' 29 In August 2010, the group completed its work on the development of its Proposed International Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity. Meetings then ensued with academics, diplomats, and members of civil society to discuss the proposed convention and seek support for it.
The proposed convention comprises ''three core pillars'': prevention, punishment, and effective capacity building to facilitate such prevention and punishment. Prevention, then, is purportedly an essential component of the proposed convention. 30 Ostensibly, those who developed the proposed convention on crimes against humanity believe that it can replace the UNCG for, some of them argue, it covers virtually the same crimes as the UNCG and would do away with the need to engage the thorny issue of intent. That is, unlike the UNCG, where the intent of the perpetrators to destroy in whole or in part a particular group, as such, must be established in order for an act to be considered a case of ''genocide,'' intent is not needed (or, put another way, not a factor) in determining whether one act or another constitutes a crime against humanity. 31 Time and again in the recent past, both individual states and the international community sat and watched as mass atrocities unfolded before deciding whether they would act to stanch them. Reportedly, officials were either not sure (1) whether the actions constituted genocide rather than civil war, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, or something else altogether and/or (2) whether the actual intent of the perpetrators was to destroy in whole or in part a particular group protected under the UNCG. As a result, state and/or international community officials often insisted on waiting for additional evidence, even as tens and hundreds of thousands were slaughtered, before making a decision one way or the other. Essentially, officials seemed to be saying, ''Well, if it's not a case of genocide then we do not have to act, and since genocide is so difficult to ascertain, if not prove, we'd better take our time and be absolutely sure before we make our final decision.'' 32 A classic example of such wavering and dithering took place during the 1994 Rwandan Genocide. Not only did the UN fail to act, but the US also used its ''confusion'' and ''lack of certainty'' as a convenient excuse to do nothing. The fact is, the US knew full well what was happening in Rwanda but wanted to avoid, at all costs, sending troops to intervene. Those proposing the new convention seem to be saying that since crimes against humanity are easier to establish than genocide is, once the International Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity goes into effect neither states nor the international community will be able to hem and haw, at least not legitimately, over what to call atrocities before choosing to intervene or not. Neither will they be hampered by the need to establish intent.
If the proposed convention results in states, individually and collectively, actually becoming more proactive in addressing atrocity crimes and carrying out preventive and interventive efforts in a timely and effective manner, then that would certainly constitute a watershed event. But that is a huge if.
It seems as if realpolitik will come into play just as strongly as ever when a nation or the UN (here I am thinking of the UN Security Council, particularly the P5) is faced with a potential or actual outbreak of crimes against humanity or genocide. Unless I am missing something, it seems as if the steering committee and its supporters are being rather naïve when it comes to their belief in the efficacy of their proposed convention. Why, pray tell, would the international community suddenly lose its ostensible aversion to carrying out preventive and interventive efforts (and particularly those that are timely and effective) solely because of a new convention? And why would states suddenly succumb to readily carrying out preventive measures and interventive missions that, as most seem to fear, could cost them dearly in a variety of ways: politically at home, politically internationally by possibly angering both allies and enemies, militarily as a result of soldiers coming home in body bags, and monetarily? And why would countries all of a sudden be more willing to join preventive and interventive efforts when many already fear potential quagmires (here, the United States' disastrous intervention in Somalia in 1993 comes to mind), including those from which they might not be able to extricate themselves for years (and here US involvement in Vietnam comes to mind along with the more recent examples of Iraq and Afghanistan)?
Indeed, one has to wonder why those proposing the new convention believe that much of anything will really change as a result of the convention. It is understandable why they may believe that it will be much easier to prosecute atrocities as crimes against humanity than as genocide, but prevention and intervention are something altogether different.
The major point here, again, is that a tremendous amount of work needs to be done to overcome realpolitik and a lack of political will. To not face this fact is sheer folly. Sadly, the enactment of additional human rights law is not enough to accomplish material change in global politics.
A Critical Need to Be More Inclusive
Just as the number of scholars in the field of genocide studies has increased exponentially over the past decade and a half so has the number of topics, issues, and cases that are now being addressed by these scholars. 33 What is rarely addressed by genocide scholars, though, are issues such as conflict resolution, mediation, conflict prevention, conflict management, peacemaking, peacebuilding, peace maintenance, peace enforcement, two-track diplomacy, multi-track diplomacy, sanctions, sanctions regime, humanitarian assistance, and international development (e.g., environmental sustainability and sustainable economic and human development). Each of the aforementioned concepts-generally studied by those in the fields of international relations (IR) and peace studies-merits serious consideration by genocide scholars. By overlooking, or outright ignoring, the research and practical applications of such issues, genocide scholars may be overlooking concepts, research, and effective means to detect and head off conflict that may have the potential to explode into crimes against humanity and/or genocide. By focusing on such issues, the field could potentially move from its heavy emphasis on intervention to one more geared to prevention. The most salutary effect would be saving tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of lives.
Furthermore, by becoming conversant with select concepts and approaches studied by researchers in other fields, both through research and application, genocide scholars can begin to address conflicts and cleavages that, if left to fester, could once again burst into crimes against humanity or genocide. While some research on post-genocide societies exists, much more needs to be done.
It would also behoove IAGS and INoGS to extend personal invitations to peace and IR researchers and practitioners involved in theoretical work and research germane to conflict and conflict resolution to (1) join IAGS and/or INoGS, (2) co-conduct research, (3) publish in Genocide Studies and Prevention and the Journal of Genocide Research, and (4) attend and present at IAGS and INoGS conferences. Such trans-disciplinary collaboration has the potential to enrich both fields and lead to significant breakthroughs on prevention and intervention.
Genocide scholars should also collaborate more with international human rights organizations, scholars, and activists. Here one thinks of the important work of Human Rights Watch (HRW), and particularly Dr. Alison des Forges, in Rwanda in the early 1990s as HRW tracked, analyzed, and reported on new violations of human rights infractions, including test massacres, as they took place. 34 At the time, only a tiny number of genocide scholars had a clue as to what was happening in Rwanda, and that could have been avoided if genocide scholars had either been more astute, more tuned into the significance of the ever-increasing violations of human rights of the Tutsi, or had been working side-by-side with human rights specialists in monitoring the situation. While genocide scholars certainly appreciate the value of tracking such violations, very few did then, just as very few do now, and certainly not as assiduously as HRW or Amnesty International.
Monitoring ''Hot Spots''
For well over two decades various scholars, and particularly first-generation genocide scholars, have talked about the need for and value of genocide early warning signals and genocide early warning systems. Early on, there was a flurry of activity along those lines-plans, papers, and talks-but to date all the good intentions have resulted in naught.
Both the UN and individual states, including the US, have also addressed the need for a genocide early warning system and have actually put in great amounts of time, thought, and energy toward developing one, but such a system remains more of an idea than a reality. One has to wonder, though, just how valuable such a system would be in the hands of, say, the UN Security Council. After all, there was no dearth of information about the 1994 Rwandan Genocide or the outbreak of violence in Darfur and yet the responses of the UN and individual states to each were anemic, apathetic, and pathetic.
Some have suggested that reports by journalists could more or less serve as early warning signals. While some have, it is also a fact that journalists are neither trained to decipher potential early warning signals nor in the business of doing so. It is also a fact that journalists have misjudged and misinterpreted outbreaks of violence. That is not surprising, nor is it an indictment of them.
That said, with their expertise and abiding interests, genocide scholars could serve the double duty of monitoring conflicts and ascertaining whether outbreaks of violence are cases, for example, of internecine fighting, crimes against humanity, genocide, or something else. 35 To do this in the most effective manner possible, scholars would need to be on the ground in ''hot spots'' where conflict is brewing or violence has already broken out. To date, though, very few genocide scholars have made the effort to travel, live, and conduct research in such places.
By being on the ground in hot spots, researchers are likely to glean information that is not readily available from other sources. 36 Over and above the locals, I am thinking about such individuals as locally based reporters, non-governmental personnel, intergovernmental personnel, local and regional leaders, and possibly even rebel groups and military personnel. While collecting valuable data, genocide scholars could monitor political tremors in the country, assess the reactions of the people to such tremors and the reactions of the government to the reactions of the people, obtain information that could serve as genocide early warning signals, and act as early warning signalers. Indeed, if scholars were to provide key information and daily, if not hourly, updates to media sources across the globe, international human rights organizations, government officials in different countries, the UN, and fellow genocide scholars, it would be virtually impossible for UN officials or individual states to feign ignorance about such events. They certainly would not be able to make absurd statements about not knowing, as US President Bill Clinton did, some four years after the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, as he spoke with a small gathering of survivors on the tarmac of the Kigali International Airport in Rwanda:
It may seem strange to you here, especially the many of you who lost members of your family, but all over the world there were people like me sitting in offices, day after day after day, who did not fully appreciate the depth and the speed with which you were being engulfed by this unimaginable terror. 37 With today's technology-satellite (SAT) phones, Internet, mobile phones, social media sites (e.g., Twitter), and so forth-it is possible to provide regular updates to those outside the region of conflict and relay key information and insights that might not otherwise reach the outside world. Not infrequently, the international media might not have a presence in a specific region prior to the outbreak of violence, might not be able to get into the country or access the region once violence has broken out, or might not be able to get in until violence is well under way, and thus an individual on the ground who relays information to outside actors can be invaluable. 38 The safety of individuals or a team would be a major concern in such situations, but there are always individuals who are willing to risk their lives to help others. And it is true that they may end up getting killed, but that is a risk that they would have to be willing to take. 39 
Is Activism by Genocide Scholars Counterproductive or is a Lack of Activism by Genocide Scholars Telling in Its Own Way?
Over the past several years, a coterie of genocide scholars have criticized certain other genocide scholars for what they refer to as ''their activism'' (e.g., co-authoring resolutions calling on the international community to act to stanch contemporary crimes against humanity and/or genocide, signing resolutions, writing editorials about governmental and intergovernmental actions or inactions during periods of crimes against humanity and/or genocide, speaking at rallies and anti-genocide conferences, etc.). Basically, the former claim that scholars who engage in activism around the issue of genocide automatically call into question the validity of their scholarship. Some have gone so far as to wonder in print whether such individuals even merit the title of ''scholar.'' Henry Huttenbach, a historian and early genocide scholar, is one of those who look askance at so-called ''scholar activists.'' In an article entitled ''Can Genocide Be Prevented? No! Yes? Perhaps,'' he asserts, A primary purpose of Genocide Studies is, of course, the hope that policy makers will be assisted by the insights of researchers. But theirs is to be activists, the opposite mindset of disinterested scholarship. The two-research and public policy-must be carefully kept distinct. Their blurring leads to scholar-activists, a slippery slope to polemics and the loss of credibility. It is a position held by Genocide Research (sic), a stance that clearly and unambiguously distinguishes it from other journals dealing with genocide but tempted to opening the door to partisan prescriptions. 40 The State and Future of Genocide Studies
Here, Huttenbach clearly shows that he readily accepts-no questions asked, no doubts pondered, no exceptions envisioned-the traditional perception of the scholar as one who can be, should be, and is wholly ''disinterested'' vis-à -vis his or her subject of research. So be it. That is his opinion, his prerogative. And no doubt there are many who likely agree with him and decry so-called scholar activists. But, speaking for myself and only myself, assuming that for all of eternity I have one life to live on this planet, I am not about to stand by and be silent in the face of mass murder. It is as simple (and profound) as that. Period.
Interestingly, certain leaders of INoGS have repeatedly criticized and mocked the title of IAGS's journal, Genocide Studies and Prevention (GSP). In doing so, they insinuated that neither IAGS members nor the editors were serious scholars since they ostensibly mixed activism (read: prevention) with scholarship. One has to wonder whether such critics also hold in contempt those physicists, chemists, and engineers who founded and/or wrote for The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, an activist journal if there ever was one. 41 The journal's past and present board members read like a Who's Who of some of the world's most renowned scientists. 42 Over the years, its regular contributors include such luminaries as Bernard T. Feld, a key member of the Manhattan Project who served as an assistant to Enrico Fermi and later became a professor of physics at MIT; Philip Morrison, who served as the group leader and a physicist on the Manhattan Project at the laboratories of the University of Chicago and Los Alamos and later became a professor of physics at MIT where he conducted research on quantum electrodynamics, nuclear theory, radiology, isotope geology, and, since the 1950s, cosmic-ray origins and propagation, gamma-ray astronomy, and other topics in high-energy astrophysics and cosmology; and George Kistiakowsky, chemistry professor at Harvard who was a member of the Manhattan Project and later served as US President Dwight David Eisenhower's Science Advisor. The point is, every single scientist mentioned here (and in the Endnotes) was concerned with and spoke out about the dangers of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and yet continued to produce high quality research and, in some cases, made world-shaking discoveries.
A blanket statement that genocide scholars who are vitally concerned with the prevention of and intervention in genocide are dubious scholars, cannot disentangle their activism from their scholarship, and are lesser lights because of their activism is ludicrous. Indeed, such remarks call into question the logic and moral compasses of those who utter them. One has to wonder how an individual can work in the field of genocide studies and not be vitally concerned with preventing genocide and, when crimes against humanity and/or genocide are about to or do actually erupt, avoid at all costs registering one's dismay and concern and avoid issuing criticism if the international community does not act to stanch such atrocities in a timely and effective manner.
Conclusion
Only time, of course, will tell how the field of genocide studies will evolve from this point forward. Personally, I hope the field works toward and has a positive impact on bringing about a regime of prevention and intervention in which prevention is a given and intervention, when needed, is quick, efficient, and effective. At the same time, I hope that the field continues to attract new scholars who are committed to producing outstanding scholarship while simultaneously acting on their humanity to help others in dire need. Finally, I hope all remember, and act upon the fact, that suffering does not end once the killing has ended. and crimes against humanity while a conflict is ongoing; and from the strengths and weaknesses of so-called safe corridors and safe areas to the impact of climate change on conflict and mass violence. 34. See Alison Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda (New York:
Human Rights Watch, 1999). 35. During the early days of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda there was genuine confusion among various actors in regard to what was taking place. For example, the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) initially thought a coup d'état was under way, some pundits claimed that a civil war had broken out, while others initially claimed that it was an outbreak of violence among antagonists who had a long history of feuding as far back as the pre-colonial period, and some expatriates who had been working and living in Rwanda for years thought it was the outbreak of chaotic killing by extremists. Both the US government and the United Nations, though, had received ample information cum warnings that crimes against humanity and possibly genocide were under way. 36. A scholar on the ground generally has ready and ongoing access to individuals who are often quite willing to speak at length about the local culture, the personalities and motives of key actors, the ins and outs of local and regional politics, antecedents to the conflict, how the conflict evolved over time, and even plans for the future. Furthermore, being on the ground provides a scholar with the means to seek different perspectives; to monitor daily, if not hourly, incidents (rallies and protests, violent events, movement of troops and weapons); seek statements and warnings (rumors, declarations by politicians, bulletins posted on walls, memoranda intercepted by rebel forces, etc.); and observe concerns (e.g., fears of the locals). Informal conversations are often as instructive and informative as formal meetings. Not even taking into account what one can ascertain from the locals, the views and insights of NGO personnel (particularly those who have been in country for years and are often responsible for writing weekly reports about the status of the country and region in which they are working, the concerns of the locals, the concerns and positions of local and regional politicians, speeches given by government officials, statements in the press, and even rumors afloat) are frequently invaluable. 37. Bill Clinton, quoted on Frontline (#1710), ''The Triumph of Evil'' produced by Mike
Robinson and Ben Loeterman, reported by Steve Bradshaw (25 January 1999), www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/evil (accessed 24 August 2011). 38. Short of researchers remaining or heading into an area that is explosive, researchers outside the area of conflict who have contacts in the region of conflict can request updates and then pass them on to the international media, human rights organizations, government officials, genocide scholars, and others. In other words, such individuals can serve as relay persons in getting the information out to the larger world. This, in fact, is the exact role I played during the first six weeks of the outbreak of violence in the Nuba39. By sheer coincidence, some two weeks after this article was submitted to the University of Toronto Press, I was contacted by an organization called Our Humanity in the Balance and invited to become a board member. Its mission statement reads as follows: ''Our Humanity in the Balance is an international group of volunteers developing innovative strategies to protect civilian populations in conflict areas, beginning in Darfur. We also intend to partner, where and when possible, with community groups in those areas to leverage our efforts.'' Its ''motto'' is: ''We will go where we need to go to protect civilians in conflict zones and to prevent genocide.'' After checking out the organization's Web site and communicating via e-mail with three of the leaders of the organization, I readily and heartily chose to accept the invitation. 
